
Wiley - Wiley
Release date: 2007-08-31
Hardcover
Author: Sean D. Carr
Economic History, Finance & Accounting, Investment & securities, Business & Economics, Business / Economics / Finance, Business/Economics, USA, Business & Economics / Finance, Finance, 1907, 20th century, Depressions, Financial crises, History, Stock exchanges, United States




Gotta say I am surprised on this one. After reading the reviews I bought the book, and started off pretty saddened with the content.
There is no history to the crisis, and by all accounts the authors seem to figure it was triggered by the SF earthquake, but without any context or data it is hard to trust their logic at all. Then, about 30 pages in, the good part begins, but it tells a story, not per se a case study. The story is well crafted and moves right along, taking you through 2 months in late 1907. This continues for 100 pages, and then the story ends and the authors go off drawing conclusions as to what happened and why, with no context whatsoever. And I have to say, one reason for the crash they list is that financial markets are complex. Really? If I had submitted this as a paper in college, my professors would have made me re-write it.
I guess to put it into today's terms, it would be like trying to determine why Merrill Lynch failed in the fall of 2008 by starting with the failure of Bear Sterns in the spring of 2008. There is a fair bit of history that should be communicated probably starting in 1996 onwards. This book looks only at a very short time frame.
If you want to read a nice story of this sort, "The Great Crash of 1929" or "Reminiscences of a Stock Operator" would be much better purchases. If you already read both of those, then go for this one, but it will not be as good.
If you are looking for a detailed study as to why the panic of 1907 happened, this is not the book.
The financial industry has always been inter-linked, and this book clearly shows that systemic risk is nothing new. While the book is interesting, it often seems to dwell on minutia, and at other times fails to connect the dots to give the reader the "big picture". For instance, the international flow of gold during the crisis is discussed in numerous segments of the book, yet there is no discussion of the gold standard and what if any impact it had.
You can see what happens in a crisis of this nature with no Federal Reserve. Men like Morgan, sensing the danger, lead the financial industry through the crisis, while the President does little more than follow his lead. Sound familiar?
I read with interest the glowing reviews of this book so I bought it. Was I ever disappointed. I have not attended business school, but it appears that this "book" may be the basis of a "case study" in business school (I think the author's slipped at the end when they just about say as much on page 152, "Any single case study, such as the one we have presented here...") The "chapters" are so brief you can read two or three of them while waiting in line for a cup of coffee, and they basically amount to this: (1) a great financial calamity occurred; (2) JP Morgan said "I'll fix it", and (3) he did. The next chapter is (1) another great financial calamity occurred; (2) JP Morgan said "I'll fix it", and (3) he did. Repeat till you get to the end of this extremely short "book" (which is 178 pages, excluding notes.) I have nothing against JP Morgan, mind you, and have read some excellent books about him--as can you, if you buy something else. For what it's worth, I would have given the book two stars instead of only one but for the fact that the authors (academics with grand titles, no less--check out the book's back flap) are apparently accustomed to charging outrageous prices for what they force their B-School students to buy. The price of this book--even with Amazon's outstanding discount--leaves it vastly overpriced. There are no new lessons here, nothing you can't figure out yourself, and nothing worth the price.